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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2038 
___________ 
 
GUILLERMO RUIZ, 
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN B.A. BLEDSOE 
____________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 12-cv-00106) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard P. Conaboy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 28, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 17, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Guillermo Ruiz appeals pro se from an order of the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing his habeas petition filed pursuant to  
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28 U.S.C. § 2241.  For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment of 
the District Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 In 1998, Ruiz was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession of ammunition 
that had moved in interstate commerce), and 26 U.S.C. § 5861(i) (possession of a silencer 
without a serial number).  At sentencing, the District Court classified Ruiz as a career 
offender under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)1, based on 
three prior Florida state court convictions.
2
  He was sentenced to 312 months of 
imprisonment.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed his 
conviction and sentence on direct appeal.  See United States v. Ruiz, 253 F.3d 634 (11th 
Cir. 2001).  Ruiz then filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the Southern 
District of Florida.  The motion was dismissed as time-barred, and the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals denied a certificate of appealability.   
 Ruiz filed the instant § 2241 petition in January 2012, arguing that his sentence 
enhancement as a career offender is unlawful.  Specifically, he claims that the federal 
                                              
1
 Section 924(e)(1) provides for an enhanced sentence “[i]n the case of a person who 
violates [18 U.S.C. § 922(g)] and has three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony 
or serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another.”   
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). 
 
2
 The documents submitted by Ruiz indicate that his ACCA enhancement was premised 
upon two 1993 burglary convictions, and a third 1995 conviction for grand theft, burglary 
with assault, and kidnapping.  (See Dist. Ct. Dkt. #1, p. 20.) 
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sentencing court acted improperly by using a “non-existent offense” or a non-qualifying 
predicate state conviction which resulted from a nolo contendere plea as a basis for 
imposing the ACCA enhancement.  Ruiz contends that his argument should be reviewed 
on the basis of Begay v. United States, 553 U.S.  137 (2008) (holding that driving under 
influence conviction under New Mexico law is not a violent felony under ACCA).  The 
District Court dismissed the petition, holding that Ruiz failed to demonstrate that a 
motion under § 2255 would be an inadequate or ineffective remedy.  Ruiz filed a timely 
notice of appeal.
3
   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s legal conclusions.  Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  A motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court is the 
presumptive means for a federal prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or 
sentence.  Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002).  A petitioner can 
seek relief under § 2241 only if the remedy provided by § 2255 is inadequate or 
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.  In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249-51 (3d 
Cir. 1997).  A § 2255 motion is not “inadequate or ineffective” merely because the 
petitioner cannot meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of § 2255, Okereke, 307 
                                              
3
 While the appeal was pending, the District Court denied Ruiz’s timely motion for 
reconsideration of its order.  However, because Ruiz did not file a newer amended notice 
of appeal after that order issued, the issue of reconsideration is not before this Court.  See 
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); United States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 664, 668 (3d Cir.  
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F.3d at 120, or because the sentencing court does not grant relief, Cradle v. United States 
ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).  Rather, the “safety valve” 
provided under § 2255 is extremely narrow and has been held to apply only in unusual 
situations, such as those in which a prisoner has had no prior opportunity to challenge his 
conviction for actions later deemed to be non-criminal by an intervening change in law.  
Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120 (citing In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251).  For example, in 
Dorsainvil, we allowed the petitioner to proceed under § 2241 because an intervening 
change in the law decriminalized conduct for which he had been convicted, and he had no 
earlier opportunity to challenge that conviction.  Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251.  
 Ruiz has not shown that a § 2255 motion would be inadequate or ineffective.  As 
the District Court noted, Ruiz essentially raises the claim that he presented in his original 
§ 2255 motion.  See United States v. Ruiz, S.D. Fla. 03-cv-21621, Motion to Vacate.  
Section 2255 is not inadequate to test the legality of that claim merely because the 
sentencing court dismissed Ruiz’s § 2255 motion as time-barred.  See Cradle, 290 F.3d at 
539. 
 Although Ruiz argues, based on Supreme Court precedent issued after his § 2255 
motion was adjudicated, that he should not have been subject to the career offender 
enhancement,  he has not cited any case which renders his predicate offenses non-
qualifying for purposes of the ACCA.  In Begay, the Supreme Court addressed the 
definition of “violent felony” under the ACCA, which is analogous to the definition of 
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“crime of violence” in the Sentencing Guidelines.  See United States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 
515, 519 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009).  In doing so, the Court held that a violent felony must be 
“roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed” to burglary, arson, extortion, 
or crimes involving the use of explosives.  See Begay, 553 U.S. at 142-43.  As a result, 
the petitioner’s conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol did not qualify as a 
violent felony for purposes of the ACCA.  Id. at 139.  Ruiz’s sentence was not enhanced 
based on such a conviction and Begay is therefore inapplicable.   
 In sum, the exception identified in Dorsainvil is not present here, and Ruiz may 
not evade the gatekeeping requirements of § 2255 by seeking relief under § 2241.  
Because this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court.
4
  Ruiz’s motions filed in connection with this appeal are denied.   
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 We also agree with the District Court that § 2241 does not provide Ruiz with a vehicle 
by which to raise claims that he has been denied adequate access to his legal materials 
and the prison law library.  Such claims must be raised in a civil rights action.  See  
Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 540 (3d Cir. 2002).  
